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Did the 2008 rebate fail to stimulate consumer spending?  In their recent 
influential AER articles, John Taylor and Martin Feldstein each claim that BEA aggregate 
time series data show that the 2008 rebate failed.  Re-examining the BEA data, we find 
that the data instead show there is a high probability that the rebate stimulated 
consumption.  Moreover, the hypothesis that a rebate has half the impact of ordinary 
disposable income cannot be rejected.  Thus, we find that analysis of the BEA aggregate 
time series data is consistent with the conclusion from the micro-data studies that the 
2008 rebate stimulated consumer spending.  
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  1            Did the 2008 rebate fail to stimulate consumer spending?  In their recent 
influential AER articles (May 2009), John Taylor and Martin Feldstein analyzed U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis’ (BEA) National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
aggregate time series data and concluded that the rebate failed.  In this paper we re-
examine their analysis of the BEA data. 
In February 2008 Congress enacted an economic stimulus package that included a 
tax rebate for households.  The U.S. Treasury mailed checks to households mainly in 
May, June, and July.  Most single individuals received $300 plus $300 per dependent 
child while most married couples received $600 plus $300 per dependent child.  For 
example, a family of two parents and three children received $1,500.  The rebate amount 
phased in for low-income households and phased out for high-income households.
1   
The Taylor/Feldstein conclusions from the BEA aggregate data about the 2008 
rebate contrast with two studies that use individual household micro data to study impact 
of the 2008 rebate (Parker, Souleles, Johnson, and McClelland, 2010; Sahm, Shapiro, and 
Slemrod, 2009).  Both studies conclude that the rebate had a significant effect on the 
spending of a typical household receiving the rebate. 
Jonathan Parker, Nicholas Souleles, David Johnson, and Robert McClelland 
(2010) report on their study of the effect of the 2008 rebate on consumer expenditure 
using micro-data consisting of the reports of individuals of the dollar amounts of their 
recent consumer expenditures from the Consumer Expenditure Survey conducted by the 
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics.  They write: 
 
  “Using special questions added to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, we measure 
the response of household spending to the economic stimulus payments (ESPs) disbursed 
in mid-2008.  We find that, on average, households spent 12-31% of their stimulus 
payments on non-durable goods during the three-month period in which the payments 
were received.  Further, there was also a substantial and significant increase in spending 
on durable goods, in particular autos.  Improving on previous research, these spending 
responses are estimated with precision using only variation in the timing of ESP receipt.”     
                                                 
1 Although called a “tax rebate,” the payment was technically a credit for tax year 2008 
and the phase in and phase out were based on reported income for tax year 2007.   
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Their conclusion for the 2008 rebate is similar to the conclusion from their AER 
article (Johnson, Parker, and Souleles, 2006, p1589) on the effect of the 2001 tax rebate 
using the same kind of micro data: 
 
“Using questions expressly added to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, we 
estimate the change in consumption expenditures caused by the 2001 federal income tax 
rebates and test the permanent income hypothesis.  We exploit the unique, randomized 
timing of the rebate receipt across households.  Households spent between 20 to 40 
percent of their rebates on nondurable goods during the three-month period in which their 
rebates arrived, and roughly two-thirds of their rebates cumulatively during this period 
and the subsequent three-month period.  The implied effects on aggregate consumption 
demand are substantial.  Consistent with liquidity constraints, responses are larger for 
households with low liquid wealth or low income.”   
 
Claudia Sahm, Matthew Shapiro, and Joel Slemrod (2009) evaluate the impact of 
the 2008 tax rebates using a survey of individual households about what they say they  
“mostly did” with their 2008 rebate—the Reuters/University of Michigan Survey of 
Consumers which is a nationally representative monthly survey based on about 500 
telephone interviews.  They write: 
  
“In summary, the survey results suggest that roughly one-third of the rebate 
income was spent in 2008 and that the spending response was concentrated in the first 
few months after receipt.” 
 
Their result is consistent with what they found in their study a few months earlier 
(Shapiro and Slemrod, 2009) in which they asked households what they intended to 
“mostly do” with their 2008 rebate.  Based on the answers about intent, Shapiro and 
Slemrod estimated that the typical rebate recipient intended to spend about one-third of 
the rebate in the near future.  
  3In summary, according to the micro data studies of the 2008 rebate the typical 
rebate recipient spent between one-third and two-thirds of the rebate within a half year of 
receiving the rebate.        
In this paper we re-examine the BEA aggregate time series data used by Feldstein 
and Taylor.  We consider two alternative hypotheses: (1) the Taylor/Feldstein hypothesis 
that the rebate had little or no effect (2) the hypothesis that the rebate had half the effect 
of ordinary disposable income.   
After analyzing the same data used by Feldstein and Taylor, we come to these 
conclusions.  First, we do not go to the other extreme and claim that the data show that 
the rebate definitely worked.  We find that the data do not show that the rebate failed and 
instead show there is a high probability that the true rebate coefficient is positive.  
Moreover, the hypothesis that the rebate has half the impact of ordinary disposable 
income cannot be rejected.  Thus, we find that analysis of the BEA aggregate time series 
data is consistent with the conclusion from the micro-data studies that the 2008 rebate 
stimulated consumer spending.  
 
The Op Ed Columns of Feldstein and Taylor 
 
In their AER articles, Feldstein and Taylor each refer to their op ed articles in the 
Wall Street Journal on the impact of the 2008 rebate.  In this section we review their op 
ed articles.  
Before discussing Feldstein and Taylor, it is useful to state our own hypothesis 
about how a rebate works.  In our view, when households receive a tax rebate they 
deposit the additional cash and their saving initially increases by the amount of the 
rebate.  Gradually, the household spends more than it otherwise would have.  Thus, 
immediately after a household receives a rebate check, we expect a spike in saving, but 
not a spike in spending, relative to what it would have been without the rebate.  The key 
issue is the time path of consumption spending following receipt of the rebate compared 
to what it would have been—in particular, the spending differential over the year 
following the receipt of the rebate. 
  4We accept the view associated with the permanent-income or life-cycle 
hypothesis that there is consumption spreading—consumption does not spike whenever 
disposable income spikes.  We are, however, skeptical of the extreme version of the 
permanent income or life cycle hypothesis that holds that a rebate would be spread evenly 
over the remainder of a person’s life, in which case its impact on spending in the 
following year would be virtually zero.  
Two aspects of the Feldstein and Taylor op ed articles require re-examination. 
First, to assess the impact of any policy, a comparison is required between what actually 
happened after the policy was implemented, and what would have happened if the policy 
had not been implemented.  But what would have happened can only be estimated—it 
cannot be known with certainty.  Yet both claim that by looking only at actual data—
what actually happened—it is possible to assess the impact of a policy.   
Second, they focus primarily on the immediate impact—the impact in the month 
following the household’s receipt of the rebate.  They note that there is no spike in 
consumer spending in the month after the rebate and conclude that the rebate didn’t work.  
They do not study whether the rebate raised spending gradually over the following year 
(relative to what it otherwise would have been).   
Table 1 shows the rebates paid in each month in 2008 [source: Bureau of 
Economic Analysis News Release of September 29, 2008, “Personal Income and 
Outlays: August 2008”].  The total rebate actually paid out in the two quarters was $92.6 
billion: $77.9 billion in 2008.2 and $14.7 billion in 2008.3 (these are actual amounts, not 
annual rates which would be four times greater).  
  Figure 1 shows personal consumption outlays (seasonally adjusted quarterly 
amount in current dollars) for each quarter from 2007.1 through 2009.4 but omits the two 
quarters when the rebates were received, 2008.2 and 2008.3.  We can’t know for certain 
what personal consumption outlays would have been in 2008.2 and 2008.3 had there been 
no rebates.  Figure 2 shows one possible path for personal consumption outlays in 2008.2 
and 2008.3 if there had been no rebates.   
Figure 3 gives the actual values for personal consumption outlays in 2008.2 and 
2008.3.  Compared to the possible path shown in Figure 2 (and also shown in Figure 3), 
actual personal consumption outlays were $18 billion higher in 2008.2 and $18 billion 
  5higher in 2008.3.  If this possible path would have occurred had there been no rebates, 
then the $92.6 billion rebates raised personal consumption outlays $36 billion above what 
they would otherwise have been, so the increase in outlays due to the rebates would have 
been 39% of the rebates ($36/$92.6=39%). 
Of course, we can’t be sure that consumption outlays would have followed the 
possible path shown in Figure 2.  Thus, we can’t be sure that the rebates raised personal 




  In his WSJ article, Aug 6, 2008, Feldstein asserts that he can tell the rebate didn’t 
work simply by examining how actual data changed over time.  He says:  
 
“Recent government statistics show that only between 10% and 20% of the rebate 
dollars were spent.  The rebates added nearly $80 billion to the permanent national debt 
but less than $20 billion to consumer spending.  This experience confirms earlier studies 





“Here are the facts.  Tax rebates of $78 billion arrived in the second quarter of the 
year.  The government’s recent GDP figures show that the level of consumer outlays only 
rose by an extra $12 billion, or 15% of the lost revenue.  The rest went into savings, 
including the paydown of debt.” 
 
Feldstein’s numbers are from the August 4 “News Release” of the BEA, 
“Personal Income and Outlays: June 2008 and Revised Estimates: 2005 through May 
2008” in which the BEA says:  
 
  6“In April, May, and June, changes in disposable personal income (DPI)—personal 
income less personal current taxes—were affected by the Economic Stimulus Act of 
2008.  The federal government issued rebate payments of $1.9 billion in April, $48.1 
billion in May, and $27.9 billion in June.”  This sums to $1.9 + $48.1 + $27.9 = $77.9, or 
$78 billion for 2008.2 as Feldstein reports. 
 The August 4 Release used by Feldstein presents Disposable Income, Personal 
Outlays, and Personal Saving data at seasonally adjusted annual rates.  We divide each 
number by 4 to get the actual quarterly amount and present this data in Table 2.  Each 
number in parenthesis is the change from one quarter to the next.  For example, personal 
outlays increased from $2,577.3 billion in 2007.4 to $2,601.2 billion in 2008.1, a change 
of +$23.9 billion; and increased from $2,601.2 billion in 2008.1 to $2,637.1 billion in 
2008.2, a change of +$35.9 billion.  Each number in brackets is the change of the change.  
For example, the change in personal outlays was +$23.9 billion from 2007.1 to 2008.1 
but was +$35.9 billion from 2008.1 to 2008.2, so the change of the change was +$12.0 
billion.   
Feldstein points out that the actual quarterly amount of personal outlays increased 
$23.9 billion from 2007.4 to 2008.1 and increased $35.9 billion from 2008.1 to 2008.2 
(as shown in parentheses in our Table 2).  He says this “extra” $12 billion increase [as 
shown in brackets in our Table 2] is only 15% of the $78 billion rebate received in 
2008.2. 
  Feldstein implicitly assumes that, had there been no rebate, the actual quarterly 
amount of personal outlays would have increased $23.9 billion in 2008.2 simply because 
it increased $23.9 billion in 2008.1.  He then implicitly assumes that it increased $12 
billion more than $23.9 billion--$35.9 billion—solely because of the $78 billion rebate in 
2008.2.  With these assumptions, he concludes that the $78 billion rebate caused only a 
$12 billion increase in outlays ($12/$78=15%).   
  But just because outlays increased $23.9 billion in 2008.1 doesn’t mean outlays 
would have increased $23.9 billion in 2008.2 had there been no rebate.  There’s no reason 
to expect personal outlays to increase the same amount every quarter.  For example, the 
BEA reports that from 2007.3 to 2007.4 personal outlays increased $31.8 billion, not 
$23.9 billion. 
  7What would have happened had there been no rebate in 2008.2 depends on what 
else was occurring in the economy.  House prices, the Dow Jones average, and the 
University of Michigan’s index of consumer sentiment all fell significantly (Bear Stearns 
nearly failed in March).  These declines might have caused personal outlays to increase 
less than $23.9 billion had there been no rebate.  Suppose that without the rebate other 
factors would have caused outlays to increase only $11.9 billion, not $23.9 billion.  Then 
the $78 billion rebate would have caused an “extra” $24 billion, not an “extra” $12 




In his WSJ article, November 25, 2008, Taylor gives this account of the mid-2008 
rebate to households: 
 
  “The major part of the first stimulus package was the $115 billion, temporary 
rebate payment program targeted to individuals and families that phased out as incomes 
rose.  Most of the rebate checks were mailed or directly deposited during May, June, and 
July.  The argument in favor of these temporary rebate payments is that they would 
increase consumption, stimulate aggregate demand, and thereby get the economy 
growing again.  What were the results?  The chart nearby reveals the answer [see our 
Chart 1 which is a copy of Taylor’s WSJ chart which he includes in his AER article].  The 
upper line shows disposable personal income through September.  Disposable personal 
income is what households have left after paying taxes and receiving transfers from the 
government.  The big blip is due to the rebate payments in May through July.  The lower 
line shows personal consumption expenditures by households.  Observe that consumption 
shows no noticeable increase at the time of the rebate.  Hence, by this simple measure, 
the rebate did little or nothing to stimulate consumption, overall aggregate demand, or the 
economy.” 
 
Taylor therefore claims that by looking only at how actual data changes from May 
through July he can infer that the rebate didn’t work.  He continues: 
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“These results may seem surprising, but they are not.  They correspond very 
closely to what basic economic theory tells us.  According to the permanent-income 
theory of Milton Friedman, or the life-cycle theory of Franco Modigliani, temporary 
increases in income will not lead to significant increases in consumption.” 
 
Taylor’s chart shows a spike in disposable income but no spike in consumption 
spending.  But what Taylor’s chart of actual data doesn’t show, and cannot show, is what 
would have happened to spending from May through the next twelve months had there 
been no rebate.  In mid-2008, several other influences--the fall in house and stock prices 
and the unprecedented high level of consumer debt—would likely have reduced 
spending.  Yet actual spending did not fall until September.  It is therefore possible that 
the rebate kept spending steady when it otherwise would have fallen.  Of course, no one 
can know with certainty what would have happened to spending had there been no rebate, 
but Taylor does not acknowledge this point.  
 
Taylor’s and Feldstein’s AER Regressions   
 
In their AER articles, after a brief review of their own WSJ columns, Taylor and 




Column 1 of Table 3 reprints the regression results that appear in Taylor’s 2009 
AER article.  In his regression, the dependent variable is personal consumption 
expenditures (PCE), and there are only three right hand variables: lagged PCE, rebate 
payments (which occurred only in several months in 2001 and in 2008), and disposable 
personal income excluding any rebate payments (DPY).  Taylor finds that the estimated 
DPY coefficient is 0.206 with a standard error of 0.056, therefore implying a t value of   
3.68 (0.206/0.056=3.68) and that the estimated rebate coefficient 0.048 is roughly a 
fourth of the estimated disposable-income coefficient.  The estimated rebate coefficient 
  9has a standard error of 0.055, therefore implying a t value of 0.87 (0.048/0.055=0.87).  
Taylor states (p551) that “the impact of the rebate is statistically insignificant and much 
smaller than the significant impact of disposable personal income excluding the rebate.” 
But what conclusion should be drawn from these regression results?  The point 
estimate of the rebate coefficient is (0.048) and the estimated standard error is (0.055) so 
a 95% confidence interval centered on 0.048 for the true rebate coefficient β is (-0.061, 
+0.157).
2  It is true that this 95% confidence interval includes 0.  On the other hand, 
using the same point estimate and estimated standard error, the interval centered on 0.048
with a lower endpoint of 0 and a higher endpoint of 2 x 0.048 = 0.096, (0.00, +0.096),




                                                
3  This means that the
probability that β is within this range is 61.4%; the probability that β is below this range 
is 19.3%, and above this range, 19.3%.
4  Hence, the probability that β > 0 is 80.7%.   
Thus, based on the regression results from his sample of data, it is wrong to 
conclude that the rebate didn’t work.  There is an 80.7% probability that β > 0.  An 
“insignificant” t value does not mean the rebate had no effect.  
 
2 Following Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998, p68), let t.025 be the t value that leaves 2.5% of 
the distribution in the upper tail.  Then prob(-t.025 < t < +t.025) = .95 where  
t = [(β^ - β)/sβ^] and sβ^ is the estimated standard error of β^.  This implies that prob{[β^ - 
t.025(sβ^)] < β < [β^ +  t.025(sβ^)]} = .95.  Since Taylor’s sample size is 106, with 4 
regressors including the constant term there are 102 degrees of freedom (d.f.).  Using a t 
distribution calculator we find that t.025 with d.f. = 102 equals 1.983.  Since sβ^ = 0.055 
and β^ = 0.048, the lower endpoint of the 95% confidence interval centered on 0.048 is 
0.048 - 1.983 x 0.055 = -0.061 and the higher endpoint is 0.048+ 1.983 x 0.055 = +0.157.  
3 We obtain the 61.4% confidence interval as follows.  Assuming β^ > 0, we consider the 
interval (0, 2β^).  Consider the generic confidence interval, prob{[β^ - tc(sβ^)] < β < [β^ +  
tc(sβ^)]} = 1-2c, where c is the area under the t distribution to the right of tc. We solve this 
expression for tc such that the lower bound of the confidence interval is 0: tc = β^/sβ^.  
Given tc and the degrees of freedom (d.f.), the t-distribution is used to calculate c.  In this 
sample, β^= 0.048 and sβ^=0.055 so tc = 0.048/0.055 = 0.87.  Using a t-distribution 
calculator we find that with d.f. = 102 the probability that t > 0.87 equals 0.193, so c = 
0.193.  Thus, (0, 0.096) is a 1-2c = 61.4% confidence interval. 
4 Pindyck and Rubinfeld (1998, p67) write: “Assume, for example, that β^ is .9.  If we 
choose a level of significance of 10 percent, the 90 percent confidence interval for β 
might be .6 < β < 1.2.  This means that the probability that β is within the range .6 to 1.2 
is .90.”  This is the sense in which we use the phrase the probability of β throughout the 
paper.  Stock and Watson (2007, p156) write: “A 95% confidence interval for β…is an 
interval [before actual numbers are assigned] that has a 95% probability of containing the 
true value of β.”  
  10Column 2 of Table 3 reports our replication of Taylor’s regression using his data 
and sample.  Our replication is virtually identical—the numbers in column 2 are virtually 
the same as column 1.  We find that the estimated rebate coefficient is roughly a fourth of 
the estimated disposable income coefficient and its t statistic is 0.86.  
However, in mid 2008, housing prices were falling, home foreclosures were 
rising, Bear Stearns had been barely rescued in March, and reflecting these events, the 
index of consumer sentiment was collapsing and the stock market was plunging (recall 
that Bear Stearns nearly failed in March 2008).  Table 4 shows that in June 2008 (as 
rebate checks were being received), the University of Michigan’s consumer sentiment 
index fell to a low point of 56.4 (in contrast to its January value of 78.4) and the Dow 
Jones average plunged 1,288 points.  All of these downward currents together might have 
pulled down personal consumption expenditures.  Yet Taylor apparently did not try to 
control for these downward currents.    
Inclusion of the consumer sentiment index in column 3 of Table 3 has a dramatic 
effect on the estimated rebate coefficient.  The estimated coefficient nearly doubles so 
that it is nearly half the value of the estimated disposable income coefficient (0.081 vs 
0.182) and its t statistic nearly doubles to 1.36.  
The inclusion instead of the change in the Dow Jones average in column 4 has an 
effect that is similar to the inclusion of the consumer sentiment index: it raises the 
estimated rebate coefficient and t statistic.   
Finally, the inclusion of both the consumer sentiment index and the change in the 
Dow Jones average in column 5 has a stronger effect on the rebate coefficient than either 
one alone.  The estimated rebate coefficient is now slightly greater than half of the 
estimated disposable income coefficient (0.099 vs 0.184). 
The point estimate of the rebate coefficient is (0.099) and the estimated standard 
error is (0.060) so a 95% confidence interval centered on 0.099 for the true rebate 
coefficient β is (-0.020, +0.218).
5  It is true that this 95% confidence interval includes 0.  
On the other hand, using the same point estimate and estimated standard error, the 
interval centered on 0.099 with a lower endpoint of 0 and a higher endpoint of 2 x 0.099 
                                                 
5 With 6 regressors including the constant term there are 100 degrees of freedom, and t.025 
= 1.984. 
  11= 0.198, (0.00, +0.198), is an 89.8% confidence interval for the true rebate coefficient β.
6  
This means that the probability that β is within this range is 89.8%; the probability that β 
is below this range is 5.1%, and above this range, 5.1%.  Hence, the probability that β > 0 
is 94.9%.   
In his AER article Taylor also reports results when he includes the price of oil 
(lagged three months) in his equation.  Column 1 of Table 5 reprints the regression results 
with the price of oil that appear in Taylor’s 2009 AER article.  Taylor finds that the 
estimated DPY coefficient is statistically significant with a t value of 3.42 (0.188/0.055= 
3.42) and that the estimated rebate coefficient is roughly a half of the estimated 
disposable income coefficient with a t statistic of 1.50 (0.081/0.054=1.50).    
The point estimate of the rebate coefficient is (0.081) and the estimated standard 
error is (0.054) so a 95% confidence interval centered on 0.081 for the true rebate 
coefficient β is (-0.026, +0.188).
7  It is true that this 95% confidence interval includes 0.  
On the other hand, using the same point estimate and estimated standard error, the 
interval centered on 0.081 with a lower endpoint of 0 and a higher endpoint of 2 x 0.081 
= 0.162, (0.00, +0.162), is an 86.3% confidence interval for the true rebate coefficient β.
8  
This means that the probability that β is within this range is 86.3%; the probability that β 
is below this range is 6.8%, and above this range, 6.8%.  Hence, the probability that β > 0 
is 93.2%.   
Column 2 of Table 5 reports our replication of Taylor’s regression using his data 
and sample.  Our replication is virtually identical—the numbers in column 2 are virtually 
the same as column 1.  We find that the estimated rebate coefficient is roughly a half of 
the estimated disposable income coefficient and its t statistic is 1.57. 
                                                 
6 We obtain the 89.8% confidence interval the same way we obtained the 61.4% 
confidence interval above.   In this sample, β^= 0.099 and sβ^=0.060 so tc = 0.099/0.060 = 
1.65.  Using a t-distribution calculator we find that with d.f. = 100 the probability that t > 
1.65 equals 0.051 so c = 0.051.  Thus, (0, 0.198) is a 1-2c = 89.8% confidence interval. 
7 With 5 regressors including the constant term there are 101 degrees of freedom, and t.025 
= 1.984. 
8 We obtain the 86.3% confidence interval the same way we obtained the 61.4% 
confidence interval above.   In this sample, β^= 0.081 and sβ^=0.054 so tc = 0.081/0.054 = 
1.5.  Using a t-distribution calculator we find that with d.f. = 101 the probability that t > 
1.5 equals 0.068 so c = 0.068.  Thus, (0, 0.162) is a 1-2c = 86.3% confidence interval.       
  12The inclusion of the consumer sentiment index in column 3 increases the t 
statistic of the rebate to 1.74.  The inclusion of the change in the Dow Jones average in 
column 4 increases the t statistic of the rebate to 1.73.   
Both the consumer sentiment index and the change in the Dow Jones average are 
included in column 5.  The estimated rebate coefficient is slightly greater than half of the 
estimated disposable income coefficient (0.109 vs 0.180) and its t statistic is 1.88. 
The point estimate of the rebate coefficient is (0.109) and the estimated standard 
error is (0.058) so a 95% confidence interval centered on 0.109 for the true rebate 
coefficient β is (-0.006, +0.224).
9  It is true that this 95% confidence interval includes 0.  
On the other hand, using the same point estimate and estimated standard error, the 
interval centered on 0.109 with a lower endpoint of 0 and a higher endpoint of 2 x 0.109 
= 0.218, (0.00, +0.218), is an 93.7% confidence interval for the true rebate coefficient 
β.
10  This means that the probability that β is within this range is 93.7%; the probability 
that β is below this range is 3.2%, and above this range, 3.2%.  Hence, the probability 
that β > 0 is 96.9%. 
 
Testing an Alternative Hypothesis 
 
A plausible alternative hypothesis is that a rebate payment has roughly half the 
impact of ordinary disposable income on consumption expenditure.  Summarizing his 
empirical results studying the effect of temporary tax changes and transfers on 
consumption using aggregate time series data, Blinder (1981, p47) writes: 
 
“Though the standard error is unavoidably large, the point estimate suggests that a 
temporary tax change is treated as a 50-50 blend of a normal income tax change and a 
pure windfall.  Over a 1-year planning horizon, a temporary tax change is estimated to 
                                                 
9 With 7 regressors including the constant term there are 99 degrees of freedom, and t.025 
= 1.984. 
10 We obtain the 93.7% confidence interval the same way we obtained the 61.4% 
confidence interval above.   In this sample, β^= 0.109 and sβ^=0.058 so tc = 0.109/0.058 = 
1.88.  Using a t-distribution calculator we find that with d.f. = 99 the probability that t > 
1.88 equals 0.032 so c = 0.032.  Thus, (0, 0.218) is a 1-2c = 93.7% confidence interval.       
  13have only a little more than half as much impact at a permanent change of equal 
magnitude, and a rebate is estimated to have only about 38 percent as much impact.” 
 
We consider the null hypothesis that the true rebate coefficient is half the value of 
the true disposable income coefficient--equivalently, the rebate coefficient minus half the 
disposable income coefficient is equal to zero.  In the Table 3 regressions where an oil 
price is not included in any equation, the ratio of the estimated rebate coefficient to the 
estimated disposable income coefficient in each column, from left to right, is as follows: 
column 1, .048/.206= .23; column 2, .048/.206=.23; column 3, .081/.182=.45; column 4, 
.072/.205=.35; and column 5, .099/.184=.54.     
We perform a t test of the hypothesis that the rebate coefficient minus half the 
disposable income coefficient is equal to zero.  In column 2 of Table 3 which has 
Taylor’s variables, the point estimate of the rebate coefficient minus half the disposable 
income coefficient is -0.054 and the estimated standard error of the “difference” is 0.058 
so a 95% confidence interval for the true difference is (-0.169, + 0.061) which 
comfortably includes the value of 0.  Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
rebate coefficient equals half the disposable income coefficient—i.e. the difference is 0.  
It can be shown that the interval centered on -0.054 (-0.108, 0.00) is a 17.7% confidence 
interval so that the probability that the true value of the difference is positive is 41.2%.   
In column 5, where the regression includes Taylor’s variables plus the consumer 
sentiment index and the change in the Dow Jones average, the point estimate of the rebate 
coefficient minus half the disposable income coefficient is +0.007 and the estimated 
standard error of the “difference” is 0.064 so a 95% confidence interval for the true 
difference is (-0.120, + 0.134) which comfortably includes the value of 0.  Once again, 
we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the rebate coefficient equals half the disposable 
income coefficient—i.e. the difference is 0.  It can be shown that the interval centered on 
+0.007 (0.00, 0.014) is a 45.7% confidence interval so that the probability that the true 
value of the difference is positive is 72.8%.   
We also test the null hypothesis using the regressions in Table 5 where an oil 
price is included in each equation.  In the Table 5 regressions, the ratio of the estimated 
rebate coefficient to the estimated disposable income coefficient in each column, from 
  14left to right, is as follows: column 1, .081/.188= .43; column 2, .086/.189=.46; column 3, 
.100/.179=.56; column 4, .096/.190=.51; and column 5, .109/.180=.61.     
Again we perform a t test of the hypothesis that the rebate coefficient minus half 
the disposable income coefficient is equal to zero.  In column 2 of Table 5 which has 
Taylor’s variables, the point estimate of the rebate coefficient minus half the disposable 
income coefficient is -0.009 and the estimated standard error of the “difference” is 0.057 
so a 95% confidence interval for the true difference is (-0.122, +0.104) which 
comfortably includes the value of 0.  Thus, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that the 
rebate coefficient equals half the disposable income coefficient—i.e. the difference is 0.  
It can be shown that the interval centered on -0.009 (-0.018, 0.00) is a 43.7% confidence 
interval so that the probability that the true value of the difference is positive is 28.1%%.   
In column 5, where the regression includes Taylor’s variables plus the consumer 
sentiment index and the change in the Dow Jones average, the point estimate of the rebate 
coefficient minus half the disposable income coefficient is +0.019 and the estimated 
standard error of the “difference” is 0.062 so a 95% confidence interval for the true 
difference is (-0.104, +0.142) which comfortably includes the value of 0.  Once again, we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis that the rebate coefficient equals half the disposable 
income coefficient—i.e. the difference is 0.  It can be shown that the interval centered on 
+0.019 (0.00, 0.038) is a 38.0% confidence interval so that the probability that the true 




In contrast to Taylor who presents his regression results with details in a table, 
Feldstein provides only this paragraph (p557): 
 
“More recently, Stephen Miran and I estimated a consumer expenditure equation 
using monthly data from January 1980 through November 2008.  While the marginal 
propensity to consume (MPC) out of real per capita disposable income is estimated to be 
0.70, the estimated MPC from the corresponding rebate variable is only 0.13 (standard 
error 0.05). (The other variables in the equation are the unemployment rate, the ten-year 
  15interest rate, and a quadratic time trend.) A variety of short distributed lag specifications 
confirms this result and indicates that there is no delayed impact of the rebate; all of the 
monthly lag coefficients are completely insignificant and their sum is negative.”   
 
Note that the implied t statistic of his rebate variable is 0.13/0.05=2.6 so that even 
his regression makes it likely that the rebate had a positive effect on consumption.  Like 
Taylor, Feldstein did not include the consumer sentiment index or the change in the Dow 
Jones average to capture consumer anxiety.  The unemployment rate variable is not a 
satisfactory substitute because it lags behind the economy.  For example, in May 2008 the 
unemployment rate was still only 5.4%.  By contrast, the consumer sentiment index had 
already plunged.         
 
Regressions with Quarterly Data 
 
  Neither Taylor nor Feldstein report regressions with quarterly data that are 
commonly used in macro-econometric models.  Moreover, quarterly data may be 
preferable for testing the impact of a rebate on consumption because, as we emphasized 
earlier, when a household receives a rebate check it usually deposits the check, initially 
raising its saving, and only gradually raises its spending over the next year, so one month 
may not be enough time to detect the impact of the rebate on spending.   
Table 6 presents regression results over Taylor’s sample period using the BEA 
quarterly data that corresponds to Taylor’s BEA monthly data.  The regressions include 
the same variables used in the monthly regressions reported in Tables 3 and 5.  In Table 
6, from left to right, columns 1 through 4 report the same regressions as Table 3 where 
the oil price is omitted, and columns 5 through 8 report the same regressions as Table 5 
where the oil price is included.  In column 1 of Table 6 the rebate coefficient is 0.170 
with a t value of 2.10.  By contrast, in column 1 of Table 3 with monthly data, Taylor’s 
regression equation had a rebate coefficient of only 0.048 with a t value of only 0.87.   
Thus: If Taylor had used quarterly data instead of monthly data, he would have 
found a statistically significant impact of a rebate on consumer spending.  
  16  Columns 2 through 4 of Table 6 include first the consumer sentiment index, then 
the change in the Dow Jones average, and then both.  Columns 5 through 8 repeat 
columns 1 through 4 except they include the oil price.  In all eight equations (columns 1 
through 8), the rebate coefficient stays about 0.16 with a t statistic about 2. 
When a rebate is received, the coefficient of the rebate variable shows the 
marginal propensity to consume in the same quarter.  But the rebate continues to affect 
spending in the next quarter through the lagged personal consumption expenditure (PCE) 
variable.  In column 1, the coefficient of lagged PCE is 0.728 and the rebate coefficient is 
0.170.  This implies that in the second quarter, the lagged effect of the rebate on 
consumption would be 0.728 x 0.170 = 0.124, so the impact of the rebate on spending 
over two quarters equals (0.170 + 0.124) = 0.294 as indicated in the table—the two-
quarter MPC is 0.294.  Similarly, the impact over four quarters equals (0.170 + 0.124 + 
0.090 + 0.066) = 0.450.
11   
Looking across all eight columns: The two-quarter marginal propensity to 
consume is fairly stable at roughly 0.28 and the four-quarter marginal propensity to 




Did the 2008 rebate fail to stimulate consumer spending?  In their recent 
influential AER articles (May 2009),  John Taylor and Martin Feldstein claim that the 
U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis’ National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) 
aggregate time series data show that the 2008 rebate failed.  They conclude that policy 
makers should therefore not repeat a failed policy.   
In this paper we re-examined the BEA aggregate time series data used by 
Feldstein and Taylor.  We found that the aggregate time series data do not show that the 
rebate failed.  In this paper we considered two alternative hypotheses: (1) the 
Taylor/Feldstein hypothesis that the rebate had little or no effect (2) the hypothesis that 
the rebate had half the effect on consumption of ordinary disposable income.   
                                                 
11 The same calculation gives the lagged effects of ordinary disposable income (DPY) 
shown in the table. 
  17After analyzing the same data used by Feldstein and Taylor, we came to these 
conclusions.  First, we did not go to the other extreme and claim that the data show that 
the rebate definitely worked.  We found that the data do not show that the rebate failed 
and instead show there is a high probability that the true rebate coefficient is positive.  
Moreover, the hypothesis that the rebate has half the impact of ordinary disposable 
income cannot be rejected.  Thus, we found that analysis of the BEA aggregate time 
series data is consistent with the conclusion from the micro-data studies that the 2008 
rebate stimulated consumer spending. 
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TABLE 1  2008 REBATE 
 
April    $  1.9 billion 
2008.2   May     $48.1 billion    $77.9 billion 
June     $27.9 billion 
 
July $13.7  billion 
2008.3   Aug  $  1.0 billion    $14.7 billion 
Sep  $  0.0 billion  
 
Total                   $92.6  billion 
 
  19TABLE 2  ACTUAL QUARTERLY AMOUNTS 
 
2007.4   2008.1   2008.2      
 
Disposable  Income   2,587.9 2,610.0 2,708.4  
     (Change)         (+22.1)     (+98.4)  
     [Change of the Change]      [+76.3] 
Personal  Outlays   2,577.3 2,601.2 2,637.1  
     (Change)         (+23.9)     (+35.9)  
     [Change of the Change]      [+12.0] 
Personal Saving         10.6       8.8                71.2    
     (Change)                 (-1.8)    (+62.4)   
     [Change of the Change]       [+64.2] 
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TABLE 3 MONTHLY PCE REGRESSIONS WITH REBATE PAYMENTS 









   
       
Lagged PCE  0.794 0.794 0.823 0.795 0.821 
  (0.057) (0.058) (0.060) (0.057) (0.060) 
  13.93 13.69 13.65 13.86 13.73 
       
Rebate payments  0.048 0.048 0.081 0.072 0.099 
  (0.055) (0.056) (0.059) (0.057) (0.060) 
  0.87 0.86 1.36 1.26 1.65 
       
DPY (w/o rebate)  0.206 0.206 0.182 0.205 0.184 
  (0.056) (0.058) (0.059) (0.057) (0.059) 
  3.68 3.55 3.07 3.58 3.13 
       
Consumer sentiment     0.833   0.742 
     (0.514)   (0.512) 
     1.62   1.45 
         
Change in DOW      0.016  0.015 
      (0.009)  (0.009) 
      1.84  1.69 
        
R-Squared  0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
       
Standard  errors  in  parentheses;       
t values below 
Sample  period  2000.01-2008.10       
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TABLE 4 Data for 2008 
        
  Consumer                 Change in 
  Sentiment                     DOW   
        
2008.1 78.4    -614.46  
2008.2 70.8    -383.97  
2008.3 69.5   -3.50  
2008.4 62.6    557.24  
2008.5 59.8    -181.81  
2008.6 56.4    -1288.31  
2008.7 61.2    28.01  
2008.8 63.0    165.53  
2008.9 70.3    -692.89  
2008.10 57.6    -1525.65  
2008.11 55.3    -495.97  
2008.12 60.1    -52.65  
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TABLE 5 MONTHLY PCE REGRESSIONS WITH REBATE PAYMENTS WITH OIL PRICE 









   
       
Lagged PCE  0.832 0.832 0.844 0.829 0.840 
  (0.056) (0.056) (0.058) (0.056) (0.058) 
  14.86 14.78 14.47 14.72 14.40 
       
Rebate payments  0.081 0.086 0.100 0.096 0.109 
  (0.054) (0.055) (0.057) (0.056) (0.058) 
  1.50 1.57 1.74 1.73 1.88 
       
DPY (w/o rebate)  0.188 0.189 0.179 0.190 0.180 
  (0.055) (0.055) (0.057) (0.055) (0.057) 
  3.42 3.43 3.14 3.45 3.16 
       
Oil price (lagged 3 months)  -1.007 -1.100 -1.028 -1.008 -0.942 
  (0.325) (0.322) (0.334) (0.333) (0.345) 
  -3.10 -3.42 -3.08 -3.02 -2.73 
       
Consumer sentiment     0.416   0.396 
     (0.512)   (0.513) 
     0.81   0.77 
       
Change in DOW      0.009  0.009 
      (0.009)  (0.009) 
      1.05  1.01 
        
R-Squared  0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
       
Standard  errors  in  parentheses;       
t values below 
Sample  period  2000.01-2008.10       
 
  23 
TABLE 6 QUARTERLY PCE REGRESSIONS WITH REBATE PAYMENTS  
           
Lagged PCE  0.728 0.807 0.728 0.806 0.708 0.787 0.708 0.787 
  (0.089) (0.096) (0.091) (0.098) (0.099) (0.105) (0.101) (0.107) 
  8.15 8.40 7.99 8.23 7.12 7.47 6.99 7.33 
          
Rebate payments  0.170 0.149 0.169 0.148 0.170 0.149 0.171 0.149 
  (0.081) (0.079) (0.083) (0.081) (0.082) (0.080) (0.084) (0.082) 
  2.10 1.89 2.05 1.84 2.07 1.86 2.03 1.83 
          
DPY (w/o rebate)  0.272 0.205 0.273 0.206 0.286 0.218 0.286 0.218 
  (0.087) (0.091) (0.089) (0.093) (0.092) (0.097) (0.094) (0.098) 
  3.13 2.24 3.08 2.20 3.10 2.26 3.05 2.22 
          
Oil price        0.309  0.294  0.319  0.298 
          (0.624) (0.601) (0.664) (0.640) 
          0.50 0.49 0.48 0.47 
          
Consumer sentiment     1.647     1.648     1.640     1.64 
     (0.893)     (0.908)     (0.905)     (0.921) 
   1.84  1.81  1.81  1.78 
           
Change in DOW       -0.001  -0.001        0.000  0.000 
       (0.008)  (0.008)        (0.009)  (0.008) 
     -0.09  -0.12      0.05 0.02 
               
R-Squared 0.999  0.999  0.999  0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 0.999 
          
Standard errors in parentheses;             
t values below 
Sample  period  2000.1-2008.3         
          
Two  Quarters          
    Rebate  0.294  0.269  0.292 0.267 0.290 0.266 0.292 0.269 
        DPY  0.470 0.370 0.472 0.372 0.488 0.390 0.488 0.390 
          
Four  Quarters          
    Rebate  0.449  0.445  0.447 0.441 0.436 0.431 0.438 0.431 
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